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Note
GEORGIA v. RANDOLPH : CHECKING POTENTIAL
DEFENDANTS’ FOURTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS AT THE DOOR
In Georgia v. Randolph,1 the Supreme Court of the United States
considered the novel question of whether a police officer may lawfully
seize evidence from a shared premises with the consent of one cooccupant, but over the express objection of another co-occupant.2
The Court held that a warrantless search for evidence in a shared residence is unreasonable as to the physically present and objecting cooccupant even though another co-occupant consented to the search.3
In so holding, the Court conflated three distinct tests from prior
Fourth Amendment cases, namely: (1) whether a search occurred; (2)
whether a third party possessed the requisite authority to consent to
the search; and (3) whether the search was reasonable.4 Neglecting to
apply a totality of the circumstances approach and in an attempt to
reconcile its holding with two previous cases, the Court instead invented a bright-line rule that insufficiently protects the Fourth
Amendment rights of potential defendants.5 If the Court had properly employed a totality of the circumstances approach to determine
the reasonableness of the search, the Court could have reached the
same result without jeopardizing potential defendants’ privacy
interests.6
I.

THE CASE

On July 6, 2001, Janet Randolph alerted the police that her husband, Scott Randolph, had taken their son from their home following
a domestic dispute.7 When the police arrived at the Randolph home,
Janet Randolph appeared quite upset.8 She informed the police that
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).
Id. at 1518–19.
Id. at 1526.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834, 836 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
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she and her husband had marital problems9 and that he used significant amounts of cocaine.10 Not long after the police arrived, Scott
Randolph returned home and informed the officers that he left the
couple’s son with a neighbor because he worried that his wife would
take their child out of the country.11 One of the police officers, Sergeant Murray, accompanied Janet Randolph to collect the couple’s
son, and when they returned Janet Randolph again claimed that her
husband was a drug user.12 She further informed the officers that
evidence of his drug use existed within the residence.13
Sergeant Murray requested permission from Scott Randolph to
search the home, but Scott Randolph expressly refused to consent.14
Sergeant Murray next asked Janet Randolph for her permission,
which she immediately granted.15 Janet Randolph then led Sergeant
Murray to her husband’s bedroom, where the officer saw a portion of
a drinking straw coated with what he suspected was cocaine.16
After this discovery, Sergeant Murray telephoned the district attorney’s office for guidance and was instructed to discontinue the
search until he obtained a warrant.17 Meanwhile, Janet Randolph decided to withdraw her consent to the search after speaking with her
husband.18 The officers nevertheless seized the straw and brought the
Randolphs to the police station.19 Later on, the police returned with
a search warrant20 and seized approximately twenty-five more drugrelated items as evidence of Scott Randolph’s drug use.21 Based on
this evidence, Scott Randolph was indicted for possession of cocaine.22
Scott Randolph moved to suppress the drug evidence, alleging
that the police acquired the items through an unlawful warrantless
9. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1519. In May 2001, the couple separated and Janet Randolph took their son to stay with her parents in Canada. Id. Janet Randolph and her son
returned to their Georgia home a few days before this domestic dispute took place. Randolph, 590 S.E.2d at 836.
10. Randolph, 590 S.E.2d at 836.
11. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834, 852 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (Blackburn, J.,
dissenting).
19. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
20. Id.
21. Randolph, 590 S.E.2d at 852 (Blackburn, J., dissenting).
22. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
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search of his home.23 The trial court denied the suppression motion,
finding that Janet Randolph had properly authorized the search.24
The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed the trial court’s decision,
holding instead that it was reasonable for the police to abide by a
present co-occupant’s clear objection to a search.25 Judge Phipps concurred, agreeing with the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court,
but criticizing the court’s bright-line rule.26 Instead of a rule, Judge
Phipps advocated a balancing approach that considers the totality of
the circumstances.27
The Supreme Court of Georgia subsequently affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the consent of one cooccupant could not override the express refusal of another physically
present co-occupant.28 In dissent, Justice Hunstein argued that Scott
Randolph assumed the risk that his wife would consent to a search of
their residence and, accordingly, his refusal to permit the search
could not supersede Janet Randolph’s consent.29 Due to a split of
authority among the lower federal courts,30 the Supreme Court of the
United States granted certiorari to decide whether a co-occupant can
effectively consent to a search of a shared residence when another cooccupant is present and objects to the search.31
23. Id. In particular, Scott Randolph contended that Janet Randolph’s consent was
invalid because she did not possess the authority to give it and because he had unequivocally refused to grant consent. Id.
24. Id.
25. Randolph, 590 S.E.2d at 837, 840. The Court of Appeals of Georgia considered the
case after granting Scott Randolph’s application for an interlocutory appeal. Id. at 836.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision because “common authority”
should allow co-occupants to exercise privacy rights for other co-occupants. Id. at 837.
26. Id. at 840 (Phipps, J., concurring specially).
27. Id. at 840–41.
28. State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d 835 (Ga. 2004). The majority observed that although
co-occupants assume the risk that they will be unable to control access to the property
when absent, co-occupants do not assume the risk that the police will ignore their objection to a search at the scene. Id. at 837.
29. Id. at 838 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
30. Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1520 (2006). The Randolph Court explained
that each of the federal circuits facing this issue concluded that a co-occupant’s consent to
search is effective despite another co-occupant’s clear objection to the search. Id. at 1520
n.1 (citing United States v. Morning, 64 F.3d 531, 534–36 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883, 885 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (per curiam); and United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687–88 (6th Cir.
1977)). The Court also noted that the majority of state courts deciding the issue reached a
similar conclusion. Id. (citing Love v. State, 138 S.W.3d 676, 680 (Ark. 2003); and City of
Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 203–05 (Wyo. 1991)). Nevertheless, the Court indicated
that other state courts have reached the opposite result. Id. (citing State v. Leach, 782 P.2d
1035, 1040 (Wash. 1989)).
31. Id. at 1520.
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court applies a three-part analysis to Fourth
Amendment consent to search cases to determine whether: (1) a
search occurred; (2) a third party had authority to consent to the
search; and (3) the search was reasonable.32 In the first inquiry, the
Court determines if a Fourth Amendment search actually occurred by
analyzing whether a defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy
in the searched area that society recognizes as reasonable.33 In the
second inquiry, where a third party has allowed law enforcement officers to conduct a search, the Court determines whether that third
party had the requisite authority to consent by analyzing whether the
absent occupant of the searched premises assumed this risk.34 Finally,
in the third inquiry, the Court assesses whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment by examining the totality of the
circumstances.35
A. The Supreme Court Uses the Katz Test to Determine Whether a
Search Occurred Under the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.”36 Its purpose is to protect the privacy
of citizens by requiring that “neutral and detached” magistrates,
rather than impassioned and competitive law enforcement officers, issue warrants.37 The Court has long interpreted the Fourth Amendment as protecting individuals’ privacy from governmental

32. See infra notes 33–123 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Part II.A.
34. See infra Part II.B.
35. See infra Part II.C.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
37. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948). Consequently, the Court prefers that judicial officers, rather than police officers, determine when an individual’s privacy interests must give way to the needs of law enforcement. Id. at 14.

R
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intrusion,38 and as a result, has grounded its analysis of whether a
search occurred in the privacy expectations of potential defendants.39
The test for determining whether a Fourth Amendment search
occurred originated in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United
States.40 In Katz, government agents used an electronic device to listen
to and record Katz, the defendant, as he conveyed wagering information over the telephone from a public telephone booth.41 Although
both lower federal courts found Katz guilty of violating a federal antiwagering statute,42 the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the government agents’ surveillance violated Katz’s Fourth Amendment
rights.43 Justice Harlan concurred, asserting that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals (1) who demonstrate that they have a subjective expectation of privacy in a particular place and (2) whose
expectation of privacy in that place society considers reasonable.44
Applying his rule to Katz’s situation, Justice Harlan concluded that an
individual who uses a public telephone booth has an expectation of
privacy within the booth that society deems reasonable.45
The Court elaborated on this two-pronged approach in Rakas v.
Illinois,46 where police officers searched the inside of a vehicle that the
defendants, who were passengers, did not own.47 The Rakas Court
upheld the search because the defendants failed to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched areas of the automo38. E.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971) (explaining that the
Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s privacy from arbitrary and invasive police action (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949))); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (noting that the Fourth Amendment is not a general “right to privacy,” but rather protects an individual’s privacy from some types of invasion by the government (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31
(2001) (observing that the Fourth Amendment focuses on an individual’s right to retreat
into his or her home and “there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion”
(quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999) (indicating that the Fourth Amendment especially protects privacy in the home).
39. E.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33 (noting that a Fourth Amendment search occurs when law
enforcement officers violate a defendant’s privacy expectations that society considers reasonable); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984) (same).
40. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 348 (majority opinion).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 348–49, 359.
44. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
45. Id.
46. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
47. Id. at 130. Police officers arrested the defendants after discovering rifle shells and a
sawed-off rifle in the vehicle. Id. At trial, the defendants were convicted of armed robbery
and their convictions were affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court. Id. at 129.
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bile.48 In so holding, the Court explained that a legitimate
expectation of privacy can stem from real or personal property law as
well as through societal understandings.49 Although the Court in
Rakas did not find property law dispositive, it stated that such concepts
were relevant in determining an individual’s expectation of privacy in
a particular area.50 For example, an individual’s right to exclude
others may lead that individual to legitimately expect privacy in a
searched area.51
Six years later, in United States v. Jacobsen,52 the Court employed
Justice Harlan’s two-part test from Katz to determine whether a Fourth
Amendment search had occurred.53 The Jacobsen Court echoed Justice Harlan’s rule that Fourth Amendment searches take place when
the government violates a defendant’s expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.54 Additionally, the Jacobsen Court acknowledged the Rakas principle: a defendant’s legitimate expectation
of privacy must be anchored in property law concepts or societal
understandings.55
The Court again used the Katz test in 1990 when it held in Minnesota v. Olson56 that, according to societal standards, a houseguest has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in temporary quarters. The Court
opined that a houseguest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
shared premises because a host will not usually admit a visitor over the
guest’s objection.57 The Olson Court further explained that this privacy expectation was legitimate notwithstanding the houseguest’s lack

48. Id. at 148–50.
49. Id. at 143 n.12.
50. Id.
51. Id. Justice White dissented in Rakas, complaining that the majority’s reliance on
property law erroneously returned the Court to a vision of the Fourth Amendment
grounded in trespass. Id. at 163 (White, J., dissenting).
52. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
53. Id. at 113.
54. Id. During the same Term, the Court applied the Katz rule in United States v. Karo
and concluded that no search occurred when government agents installed a beeper into a
can of ether and had an informant give the can to the defendant. 468 U.S. 705, 708,
712–13 (1984). Because the beeper did not transmit any information to the police upon
installation or upon delivery to the defendant, only a potential privacy violation existed;
consequently, no Fourth Amendment search occurred. Id. at 712–13.
55. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122–23 n.22.
56. 495 U.S. 91 (1990). In so holding, the Olson Court determined that the defendant
had standing to challenge his warrantless arrest under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 93,
100.
57. Id. at 99.
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of a “legal interest” in the property or an ability to control access to
the host’s home.58
Finally, in Kyllo v. United States,59 the Court again employed the
Katz test to assess whether a search occurred pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment.60 In Kyllo, a government agent used a thermal imager to
scan the defendant’s home to determine whether he was growing marijuana.61 Based in part on the scan, a judge issued a warrant permitting a search of the defendant’s home.62 During the search, law
enforcement officials discovered over one hundred marijuana
plants.63 The Kyllo Court held that the scan itself amounted to a
search because the technology revealed information about the inside
of the home that government officials otherwise could not have acquired without physical entry.64 Again, the Court based its decision
on the reasonable expectation of privacy that individuals possess in
their homes.65
B. The Court’s Approach to Valid Third Party Consent Has Shifted
from an Agency Analysis to an Assumption of the Risk Inquiry
Due to the significant privacy interests at stake, the Court has
consistently emphasized that warrantless searches are presumptively
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.66 The Court has, how58. Id. Similarly, in Minnesota v. Carter, the Court evaluated whether defendants possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in an apartment they had visited only once to
package cocaine. 525 U.S. 83, 86–87 (1998). The lessee of the apartment allowed the
defendants to use the premises in exchange for one-eighth of an ounce of cocaine. Id. at
86. The Carter Court distinguished the case from Olson because the defendants were not
overnight guests, they visited the apartment solely for business reasons, and moreover, the
Carter defendants had no prior relationship with the lessee of the apartment. Id. at 90.
The Carter Court further explained that an individual’s expectation of privacy in commercial property is weaker than a similar expectation in his or her home. Id. Consequently,
the Court determined that the defendants did not possess a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment. Id. at 91.
59. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
60. Id. at 29, 33.
61. Id. at 29.
62. Id. at 30.
63. Id. The Ninth Circuit ruled below that Kyllo had no subjective expectation of privacy because he did not attempt to contain the heat emanating from high-intensity lamps
in his home and because the thermal imager only showed that certain exterior areas of
Kyllo’s home were hot. Id. at 30–31.
64. Id. at 34–35.
65. Id. at 34.
66. E.g., id. at 31 (warrantless search of a home); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 114 (1984) (warrantless search of a sealed package); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 474–75 (1971) (warrantless search of an automobile); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (warrantless search of a public telephone booth).
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ever, established exceptions to this rule, one of which is voluntary consent.67 Under the voluntary consent exception, individuals may
consent to a law enforcement officer’s request to search property—
and thereby permit a warrantless search—without running afoul of
the Fourth Amendment.68 Third parties who possess the requisite authority may also consent to searches of another individual’s
property.69
1. Voluntary Consent
The Court’s 1973 decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte70 explicitly
recognized a consent-based exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
ban on warrantless searches, asserting that law enforcement officers
may conduct a warrantless search if they obtain the voluntary consent
of the subject of the search.71 The Schneckloth Court considered
whether a car passenger could voluntarily consent to a police search
of an automobile during a traffic stop even where the passenger did
not know he could refuse to consent.72 To determine whether the
defendant’s consent was voluntary, the Court explained that it must
evaluate the totality of the circumstances surrounding the consent.73
Although a defendant’s knowledge of his right to refuse consent was
an important consideration in assessing voluntariness, the Schneckloth
Court concluded, such knowledge is only one factor among many for
reviewing courts to consider.74 Thus, the Schneckloth Court held that
67. E.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (explaining that voluntary consent is one exception to the Fourth Amendment’s general prohibition of warrantless
searches of individuals’ homes); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 165–66, 170 (1974)
(noting that a warrantless search is valid pursuant to the Fourth Amendment when the
consenting co-occupant has common authority over the shared premises that law enforcement officers wish to search); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (observing that consent is an exception to the general rule that warrantless searches are per se
unreasonable).
68. See infra Part II.B.1.
69. See infra Part II.B.2.
70. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
71. Id. at 243 (“[T]here is nothing constitutionally suspect in a person’s voluntarily
allowing a search.”).
72. Id. at 220–22. The search of the automobile yielded stolen checks. Id. at 220.
73. Id. at 227.
74. Id. To determine whether consent is voluntary, the Schneckloth Court indicated that
the necessity of a search must be weighed against the requirement that the defendant not
be coerced to consent. Id. The Court further explained that several factors should be
considered when determining the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession: the defendant’s age, the defendant’s education and intelligence, the extent to which the defendant
was aware of his or her constitutional rights, the length of questioning and detention, and
the physical punishment to which law enforcement officers subjected the defendant. Id. at
226.
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the defendant voluntarily consented to the automobile’s search notwithstanding the fact that he did not know of his right to refuse.75
Twenty-three years later, in Ohio v. Robinette,76 the Court similarly
found that police officers do not need to advise detainees that they
are free to leave before their consent to a search may be considered
voluntary.77 In Robinette, a police officer stopped a driver for speeding
and subsequently received the driver’s consent to search the automobile.78 In holding that the officer was not required to inform the defendant driver that he was free to leave before obtaining his consent,
the Robinette Court reaffirmed the principle from Schneckloth—although valid consent must be voluntary, this determination is based
on the totality of the circumstances and not simply on the defendant’s
knowledge of his rights.79
2. Third Party Consent
The Court has extended the voluntary consent exception to encompass consent given by third parties. The Court’s early third party
consent cases, however, narrowly prescribed the instances in which a
third party could validly consent to a Fourth Amendment search. For
example, in Chapman v. United States,80 the Court did not extend the
voluntary consent exception where an absent defendant’s landlord
permitted police officers to enter and conduct a warrantless search of
the defendant’s residence.81 The search uncovered evidence of unauthorized liquor distribution and later led to the defendant’s indictment.82 The Chapman Court found the search unlawful and
explained that to hold otherwise would strip the defendant of his
Fourth Amendment rights by conditioning the security of his home
on the judgment of his landlord.83
The Court clarified its rationale in this type of consent case three
years later in Stoner v. California,84 when it explained that only the de75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 249.
519 U.S. 33 (1996).
Id. at 39–40.
Id. at 35–36. The search revealed controlled substances within the vehicle. Id. at

36.
79. Id. at 35, 39–40.
80. 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
81. Id. at 610, 615–17.
82. Id. at 610–11.
83. Id. at 616–18. The Court also explained that common law distinctions concerning
private property rights should not enter into the Fourth Amendment search equation; the
former are largely based on historical fact and should not influence the outcome of constitutional claims. Id. at 617 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266–67 (1960)).
84. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
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fendant, or an authorized agent, could grant consent to a search and
waive the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.85 In Stoner, the
Court deemed a search unlawful when law enforcement officers used
a hotel clerk’s permission to conduct a warrantless search of a defendant’s hotel room while the defendant was gone.86 In setting aside
the defendant’s armed robbery conviction, the Court determined that
the hotel clerk could not waive the defendant’s Fourth Amendment
rights because the defendant had not authorized the clerk to consent
to a search of his room.87
In 1969, the Court moved away from its short-lived reliance on
agency principles and introduced a new assumption of the risk analysis in Frazier v. Cupp.88 The defendant in Frazier argued that the trial
court should not have allowed some of his clothing into evidence.89
Police officers had seized the clothing from a duffel bag shared by the
defendant and his cousin after the cousin consented to its search.90
The Frazier Court found that the defendant’s cousin possessed the authority to validly consent to the bag’s search because, as joint users,
each had assumed the risk that the other would permit such a
search.91 The Court rejected the defendant’s contention that his
cousin only had permission to use one compartment of the duffel bag
and thus could consent only to a partial search, remarking that it refused to “engage in such metaphysical subtleties in judging the efficacy of [the cousin’s] consent.”92
The Court again employed an assumption of the risk analysis five
years later in United States v. Matlock.93 In Matlock, the police arrived at
the defendant’s home, arrested him in the front yard,94 and placed
him in a police patrol car away from the home.95 The officers then
obtained consent to search the home from Gayle Graff, who shared a
bedroom with the defendant.96 At no time did the police ask the de85. Id. at 489.
86. Id. at 485, 490.
87. Id. at 484, 489–90.
88. 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
89. Id. at 732, 740.
90. Id. at 740.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974).
94. Id. at 166.
95. Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 166 (majority opinion). The Matlock defendant did not own the home. Id.
Rather, Graff’s parents leased the residence and the defendant lived there with Graff and
several members of Graff’s family. Id.
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fendant directly whether he consented to the search.97 The Court
concluded that a co-occupant with “common authority” over shared
property could consent to a search of the premises in the absence of
another non-consenting co-occupant.98 In defining common authority, the Court renounced reliance upon property law and instead
stated that a co-occupant’s common authority rests upon joint use or
control of the property.99 In addition, the Court reasoned, mutual
control made it reasonable for the co-occupants to have assumed the
risk that any one of them would allow the police to search the shared
premises.100
The Court expanded law enforcement officers’ ability to conduct
warrantless searches pursuant to third party consent in Illinois v. Rodriguez,101 when it determined that a co-occupant with only apparent authority could consent to a search of a shared residence.102 In
Rodriguez, a woman allowed the police to enter her former residence
while the lessee of the apartment slept in his bedroom.103 The Court
held that a police officer may enter a premises based upon the consent of an individual whom a reasonable person would believe had the
authority to consent to a search of the premises.104 Thus, although
the Court’s third party consent cases were initially grounded in restrictive agency principles, its recent decisions based on an assumption of
the risk rationale afford officers broad latitude to receive consent
from third parties with some reasonable relationship to the premises.
C. The Court Looks to the Totality of the Circumstances to Determine
Reasonableness Under the Fourth Amendment
The Court has long evaluated the reasonableness of a Fourth
Amendment search by examining the circumstances of the case and
balancing competing privacy and governmental interests. For in97. Id.
98. Id. at 170.
99. Id. at 171 n.7. Specifically, the Matlock Court asserted that common authority does
not derive from a third party’s property interest in the searched property. See id. (illustrating instances where an individual cannot consent to a search despite having a property
interest in the premises (citing Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964); and Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616–17 (1961)).
100. Id.
101. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
102. Id. at 179, 186–89.
103. Id. at 179–80. The third party still had a key to the apartment and unlocked the
door for police to enter. Id. The officers found drug paraphernalia and cocaine inside,
and arrested the defendant, seized the evidence, and subsequently charged the defendant
with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Id. at 180.
104. Id. at 188–89.
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stance, the Court recognized in Camara v. Municipal Court105 that the
reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment search depends on the government’s interest in searching a premises weighed against the resulting intrusion into the defendant’s privacy.106 Two years later, the
Court expanded the number of factors that affect the reasonableness
of a search when it decided Chimel v. California.107 In Chimel, three
police officers arrested the defendant in his home and conducted a
warrantless search over his objection, characterizing their search authority as incident to the defendant’s lawful arrest.108 In finding the
search unreasonable, the Chimel Court explained that all of the facts
and circumstances surrounding the search inform the reasonableness
inquiry.109 The Court added that analyzing the totality of the circumstances does not occur in a vacuum; rather, such analysis must reflect
the purpose and history of the Fourth Amendment.110
In 1978, the Court decided Michigan v. Tyler111 and reaffirmed
the necessity of balancing the governmental interest in searches with
the resulting disturbance of individual privacy.112 The Tyler Court addressed whether certain items obtained by police and fire officials
through warrantless entries onto burned property could properly be
admitted into evidence at the defendants’ trial.113 After proposing
and addressing several factors to evaluate the reasonableness of an
investigatory fire search, the Court reversed the defendants’
convictions.114

105. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
106. Id. at 536–37.
107. 395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969).
108. Id. at 753–54. The Chimel defendant’s wife accompanied the officers as they
searched the house. Id. at 754.
109. Id. at 765, 768.
110. See id. at 765. For example, the Fourth Amendment was adopted in the historical
context of government officials using general warrants to search individuals’ property or
conducting searches without any warrant at all, which “alienated the colonists and . . .
helped speed the movement for independence.” Id. at 761.
111. 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
112. See id. at 507.
113. Id. at 501.
114. Id. at 507, 512. Specifically, the Court suggested the following as relevant factors:
how often government officials had entered the building, the scope of the search, the time
of day of the search, the amount of time since the fire, whether the building was still in use,
and the extent to which the building’s owner had attempted to prevent intruders from
entering the building. Id. at 507. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist examined all of the circumstances of the case and concluded that the searches were reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 516–18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Two years later, the Court decided Payton v. New York115 and characterized the standard of reasonableness as “amorphous.”116 In Payton, six police officers without a warrant forced open the door to the
defendant’s apartment, seized a .30 caliber shell casing in plain view,
and later introduced it into evidence at the defendant’s murder
trial.117 The Court held that the Fourth Amendment forbids law enforcement officers from entering a suspect’s home without a warrant
and without consent to effectuate a routine felony arrest.118 In so
holding, the Court noted that norms and custom are an important
part of its Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry.119
More recently, the Court explicitly adopted a totality of the circumstances approach to Fourth Amendment reasonableness. In
Whren v. United States,120 the Court stated that, in theory, every case
that arises under the Fourth Amendment requires the Court to balance “all relevant factors.”121 The Court explained that in reality,
however, when probable cause is present the Court methodically applies this balancing test to the facts of particular cases only when police officers perform searches or seizures in ways that particularly
offend defendants’ privacy interests.122 The Whren Court noted that
one example of this type of conduct is a police officer’s warrantless
entry into a potential defendant’s home.123
III.

THE COURT’S REASONING

In Georgia v. Randolph,124 the Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia and held
that a warrantless search for evidence of a shared premises is unreasonable with regard to a physically present and objecting co-occupant,
notwithstanding another co-occupant’s consent to the search.125 Writing for the majority, Justice Souter opened by explaining that the
Fourth Amendment generally forbids warrantless entry into a person’s
115. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
116. Id. at 600.
117. Id. at 576–77.
118. Id. at 576.
119. Id. at 600.
120. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
121. Id. at 817.
122. Id. at 818.
123. Id. Later that year, the Court also decided Ohio v. Robinette and observed that reasonableness is the “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment,” which courts must evaluate by
reviewing the totality of the circumstances. 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)).
124. 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).
125. Id. at 1526, 1528.

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-2\MLR204.txt

488

unknown

Seq: 14

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

12-FEB-07

15:41

[VOL. 66:475

home as unreasonable per se, but that voluntary consent is one exception to this rule.126
The Court then explained that in consent cases, the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness requirement turns on “widely shared social expectations.”127 In other words, the majority reasoned, Fourth
Amendment reasonableness depends largely on common societal understandings regarding co-occupants’ authority to influence other cooccupants’ interests.128 The Court decided that no common understanding exists that would allow one co-occupant’s authority to prevail
over another co-occupant’s articulated desires.129
Based on this analysis, the Court explained that the consent of
one co-occupant over another’s objection does not make a warrantless
search any more reasonable than if neither party had consented.130
Thus, the majority explained, one co-occupant’s consent would in no
way enhance the government’s claim when weighed against the nonconsenting individual’s interests in privacy and security.131 As a result,
the Court formulated the following rule: a physically present co-occupant’s explicit objection to a search of a shared residence is determinative as to that co-occupant, despite another co-occupant’s
consent.132 Admitting to drawing a “fine line,”133 the Court applied

126. Id. at 1520.
127. Id. at 1521.
128. Id. According to the majority, United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974), exhibited an example of this type of common understanding. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1521. The
Randolph Court explained that in Matlock, the police officers were justified in believing that
an individual lived in the searched premises when she answered the door to the home
while carrying her baby; therefore, she possessed the requisite common authority to allow
visitors “obnoxious” to other co-occupants to enter in their absence. Id. at 1521–22.
129. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1523. To arrive at this conclusion, the Court explained that
co-occupants legitimately expect privacy within a shared premises because it is improbable
that one co-occupant will admit a visitor over another co-occupant’s objection. Id. at 1522.
This understanding is apparent when a visitor arrives at the door, as the majority maintained that a visitor would feel uncomfortable entering the premises over one co-occupant’s clear objection even though another co-occupant had invited the visitor into the
residence. Id. at 1522–23.
130. Id. at 1523.
131. Id. The Court acknowledged the consenting co-occupant’s interest in aiding the
police. Id. at 1524. Nevertheless, the majority explained that sufficient alternatives existed
to protect this interest. Id.
132. Id. at 1528.
133. Id. at 1527. The Court recognized that although its rule protects a potential defendant who is present at the door to object to a police officer’s search, the rule does not
protect an absent defendant. Id. Nevertheless, the Court noted that the clarity of its rule
would aid law enforcement officers in the field. Id.
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its new rule to the facts of the case and found no justification for the
search of Scott Randolph’s home.134
Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize that
studying history alone is insufficient to ascertain the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.135 He noted that the evolving nature of consent
demonstrates why constitutional interpretation must take societal
changes into account.136 Specifically, with regard to police officers
who inform co-occupants of their constitutional rights pertaining to
consent, Justice Stevens explained that only a husband’s consent
would have mattered when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.137
Because male and female individuals are presently recognized as
equal partners, however, Justice Stevens declared that police officers
should now inform each co-occupant, regardless of gender, of their
independent constitutional rights.138
In a separate concurrence, Justice Breyer maintained that the
Fourth Amendment does not require bright-line rules, but rather insists upon an inquiry into the reasonableness of a search measured by
the totality of the circumstances.139 According to Justice Breyer’s review of the circumstances, the Court properly found Janet Randolph’s
consent ineffective in the face of her husband’s objection to the
search.140 Nevertheless, Justice Breyer noted that if the surrounding
circumstances varied significantly from those at hand, the results
would change accordingly.141
Chief Justice Roberts dissented, criticizing the majority’s reliance
on widely shared social expectations to determine reasonableness in
134. Id. at 1528. The Court also noted two arguments that the prosecution did not
make: (1) that Janet Randolph needed police protection in the area of the residence
where the officers found the drug evidence; or (2) that exigent circumstances justified the
warrantless search. Id.
In this vein and in response to Chief Justice Roberts’s critique, the majority noted that
as long as the police had “good reason” to believe that the threat of domestic violence
existed, an officer would not commit the tort of trespass by entering a home to resolve
such a dispute. Id. at 1525. The majority also stated that the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment proscription against warrantless searches would justify police entry in domestic violence cases. Id. at 1526 (citing United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d
883, 885–86 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); and People v. Sanders, 904 P.2d 1311, 1313–15
(Colo. 1995)).
135. Id. at 1528 (Stevens, J., concurring).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1529.
138. Id.
139. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 1530.
141. Id.
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Fourth Amendment consent cases.142 Instead, Chief Justice Roberts
argued that the voluntary consent of a co-occupant with the requisite
authority renders a warrantless search reasonable.143 He further contended that the majority’s rule will lead to severe consequences, especially in cases of domestic abuse.144 Specifically, Chief Justice Roberts
complained that the majority’s rule will prevent the police from entering a home to stop a domestic dispute should the abuser, as a cooccupant, object to police entry.145
In a separate dissent, Justice Scalia responded to Justice Stevens’s
concurrence and argued that changes in property law dictating who
may consent to a search do not modify the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.146 Additionally, Justice Scalia predicted that the majority’s decision portends the opposite of equality between the sexes, as
the decision will actually allow men to prevent women from consenting to police entry into their homes.147
Finally, Justice Thomas wrote his own dissent, contending that
Coolidge v. New Hampshire squarely controlled the outcome.148 Justice
Thomas interpreted Coolidge as holding that a Fourth Amendment
search does not occur when an accused’s spouse leads the police to
possible evidence of the accused’s misconduct.149 As a result, Justice
Thomas concluded that the Court need not have considered whether
Janet Randolph’s consent was valid because no general search took
place.150
IV.

ANALYSIS

In Georgia v. Randolph, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment prohibits a warrantless search of a shared residence
142. Id. at 1531–33 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Scalia joined the Chief Justice in dissent. Id. at 1531. Specifically, Chief Justice Roberts asserted that varying social situations lead to varying social expectations. Id. at 1532.
For example, Chief Justice Roberts suggested that the place that a visitor enters, such as a
bedroom shared between bickering roommates versus a common area, and the number of
co-occupants who invite a visitor into the residence, would affect the parties’ social expectations. Id.
143. Id. at 1531. Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that when co-occupants decide to live
together, they assume the risk that another co-occupant will allow the police to search their
shared residence. Id.
144. Id. at 1537.
145. Id. at 1538.
146. Id. at 1540 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 1541.
148. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 1541–42 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 486–90 (1971)).
150. Id. at 1541.
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when one physically present co-occupant expressly objects to a search,
even though another co-occupant consents.151 In so holding, the
Court borrowed features from three separate Fourth Amendment inquiries concerning: (1) the existence of a search; (2) a third party’s
authority to consent to a search; and (3) the reasonableness of a
search.152 This patchwork reasoning led the Randolph Court to create
an unnecessary and arbitrary bright-line rule that dilutes potential defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights.153 Although the Court properly
found Janet Randolph’s consent ineffective in the face of her husband’s express objection, the Court should have adopted a totality of
the circumstances approach to analyze Fourth Amendment
reasonableness.154
A. The Randolph Court Conflated Three Distinct Fourth Amendment
Inquiries to Resolve the Constitutionality of the Search of Scott
Randolph’s Home
In reaching its conclusion that Scott Randolph’s objection rendered Janet Randolph’s consent invalid, the Randolph Court confused
three separate questions that arise in Fourth Amendment consent
cases. Specifically, the Court improperly used the tests for whether
Janet Randolph possessed the requisite consent authority and for
whether a search occurred to address the reasonableness of the search
of the Randolph home.155 In so doing, the Court ignored precedent
by failing to use a totality of the circumstances approach to determine
the reasonableness of the search.156 The Court’s conflation of these
tests will result in confusion for lower courts.157
1. The Court Erroneously Considered “Widely Shared Social
Expectations” to Evaluate Both Janet Randolph’s Authority to
Consent and the Reasonableness of the Search
The Randolph Court improperly used the test for determining
whether a third party possesses the authority to consent to a search to
evaluate the reasonableness of a search. In particular, the Randolph
Court indicated that the reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment
search depends, in part, on the risks that co-occupants assume in shar151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
See
See
See
See
See
See

at 1526 (majority opinion).
infra Part IV.A.
infra Part IV.B.
infra Part IV.C.
infra Part IV.A.1.
infra Part IV.A.2.
infra Part IV.A.3.
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ing a residence.158 In Frazier v. Cupp and United States v. Matlock, however, the Court used an assumption of the risk analysis only to decide
if a third party possessed the requisite authority to consent to a search,
not to evaluate the reasonableness of a search.159
Instead of inappropriately using the assumption of the risk analysis to bolster its argument that widely shared social expectations measure the reasonableness of a search, the Court should have used the
assumption of the risk analysis only as it had in Matlock and Frazier—to
determine if Janet Randolph had the authority to consent to the
search of her shared residence.160 The Randolph Court should have
followed Matlock and Frazier’s use of the assumption of the risk analysis
because those cases also analyzed a third party’s authority to consent
to a search of shared property.161 By commingling its consent and
reasonableness inquiries, however, the Court confused the standards
of its previous cases and thus undermined the strength of its decision.
The Randolph Court also failed to follow precedent by using
widely shared social expectations to determine the reasonableness of
158. See Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1521–22 (2006) (explaining that Fourth
Amendment reasonableness is based on “commonly held understanding[s] about the authority that co-inhabitants may exercise in ways that affect each other’s interests” and that
such living arrangements “include an ‘assumption of risk,’ on which police officers are
entitled to rely”).
159. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) (noting that the authority
necessary to validate third party consent derives from joint use of and access to the property “so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to
permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed [this] risk”);
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (“Petitioner, in allowing [his cousin] to use the
bag and in leaving it in his house, must be taken to have assumed the risk that [his cousin]
would allow someone else to look inside.”).
160. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. The Court also improperly relied upon
widely shared social expectations to explain that some third parties, such as hotel clerks
and landlords, do not possess the requisite authority to consent to searches of another’s
property, even though the holdings of the cited decisions rested on other grounds. Compare Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (stating that a hotel patron impliedly
allows certain hotel employees to enter the hotel room to carry out their duties, but basing
its decision on the fact that the defendant had not waived his Fourth Amendment rights
personally or through an agent), and Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616–17
(1961) (rejecting the prosecution’s argument that a landlord could consent to the search
of a tenant’s residence if the landlord’s purpose was to view waste and cautioning that
“subtle distinctions” from the law of property should not be used to determine the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment), with Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1522 (citing
Stoner and Chapman to illustrate situations where society would not recognize common
authority).
161. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 167 (examining whether an individual possessed the requisite authority to consent to a search of the premises that she shared with the defendant);
Frazier, 394 U.S. at 740 (determining whether the defendant’s cousin had the authority to
consent to a search of a duffel bag he shared with the defendant).

R
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the search of the Randolph residence.162 However, as past cases indicate, the Court has consistently only considered widely shared social
expectations in the Katz context, and predominantly to evaluate
whether a search had occurred.163 As the Court clarified in Rakas v.
Illinois, widely shared social expectations constitute one way of deciding the second element of the Katz test—whether a defendant has a
reasonable, or legitimate, expectation of privacy in searched property.164 The Court further confirmed the validity of the Katz test in
the search context with its decision in Minnesota v. Olson, when it considered common societal standards to determine that a houseguest
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his or her temporary residence.165 These cases demonstrate that the Randolph Court’s application of widely shared social expectations to its Fourth Amendment
reasonableness inquiry was in direct contrast to its past cases, which
had confined this assessment to the second step of the Katz inquiry.
2. The Randolph Court Failed to Assess the Totality of the
Circumstances to Determine Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness
By substituting widely shared social expectations as its measure of
reasonableness, the Randolph Court neglected to examine the totality
of the circumstances, which is the Court’s usual test for evaluating the
162. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1521 (“The constant element in assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness in the consent cases . . . is the great significance given to widely
shared social expectations . . . .”).
163. See id. at 1532 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that although the Court has used
societal expectations to analyze whether a search occurred and if an individual has standing to object to a search, it has not considered social expectations in the consent context
(citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95–96, 100 (1990); and Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring))).
164. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143–44 n.12 (1978). The Court employed the Rakas
principle in United States v. Jacobsen to emphasize the difference between a defendant’s
subjective and objective expectations of privacy. 466 U.S. 109, 122 & n.22 (1984).
165. Olson, 495 U.S. at 96–97, 99. The Olson Court did not weaken the reasoning underlying prior cases when it used the Katz test to decide that the defendant had standing to
object to his warrantless arrest; rather, the issues of whether a search occurred and whether
a defendant has standing to invoke the Fourth Amendment each speak to the ultimate
question of Fourth Amendment coverage and are, consequently, analyzed using the same
test. See id. at 95–100 (employing the Katz test to resolve whether the defendant could find
protection in the Fourth Amendment when challenging his warrantless arrest); see also Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113, 117 (noting that one type of expectation that the Fourth Amendment covers involves searches, which occur according to the Katz test, and further
explaining that “[t]he Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the authorities use information with respect to which the expectation of privacy has not already been frustrated”).
Similarly, in Kyllo v. United States, the Court explained that potential defendants possess at
least a minimal expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable in their homes.
533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
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reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment. The
Court’s reliance on widely shared social expectations in its reasonableness inquiry prompted it to only summarily weigh Scott Randolph’s
interests against the government’s interests.166 The Court did not,
however, engage in a full analysis of the circumstances surrounding
the case.167 Merely concluding that there is no common understanding that a consenting co-occupant may allow an objectionable guest
into a shared premises over another co-occupant’s objection does not
adequately assess the circumstances of a case.168 Because this type of
analysis is insufficient, the Court has “consistently eschewed brightline rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry.”169 Therefore, the Randolph Court’s failure to analyze

166. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1523 (stating simply that one co-occupant’s consent
“adds nothing to the government’s side to counter the force of an objecting individual’s
claim to security against the government’s intrusion into his dwelling place”).
The Randolph Court may, however, have implicitly approved of a totality of the circumstances approach in the limited case of domestic violence. See id. at 1525 (explaining that a
co-occupant’s consent would be valid when a law enforcement officer had a “good reason”
to think that domestic violence might occur inside a shared premises). In effect, this approach would validate the consent of one co-occupant over the objection of another because an additional circumstance—a police officer’s suspicion of domestic violence—
would exist to make the search reasonable despite a co-occupant’s objection.
167. The Court has stressed that reviewing courts should assess all of the circumstances
of a case in the Fourth Amendment reasonableness context. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette,
519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (stating unequivocally that the Court uses a totality of the circumstances approach to determine reasonableness); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507
(1978) (weighing a potential defendant’s interests in privacy against the government’s interest in effective law enforcement by considering six fact-specific inquiries); Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969) (noting that the reasonableness of a search is measured by considering the facts and circumstances of the case).
168. Even the Court’s earlier cases that seem to promote a standard requiring slightly
less than a full analysis of the facts do not fall back on commonly held social understandings to support the reasonableness of a search. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
817–18 (1996) (explaining that the Court must decide the reasonableness of a warrantless
search of a defendant’s home by weighing “all relevant factors”); Camara v. Mun. Court,
387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967) (remarking that a test of reasonableness requires balancing
the intrusiveness of the search against the necessity of the search for law enforcement).
But see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 600 (1980) (observing that a “longstanding, widespread practice is not immune from constitutional scrutiny. But neither is it to be lightly
brushed aside. This is particularly so when the constitutional standard is as amorphous as
the word ‘reasonable,’ and when custom and contemporary norms necessarily play such a
large role in the constitutional analysis.”). In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer better
evaluated the circumstances present in Randolph. See infra Part IV.C.
169. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39. Similarly, the Court has consistently employed a totality of
the circumstances approach as a workable standard when assessing the voluntariness of an
individual’s consent. See id. at 39–40 (noting that the voluntariness of consent is determined by evaluating all circumstances); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227
(1973) (same).
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the totality of the circumstances departed from precedent and resulted in a cursory assessment of reasonableness.
3. The Court’s Hybrid Reasoning Provides Lower Courts with an
Unworkable Standard
The Randolph Court’s conflation of the tests to determine
whether a search occurred, whether a third party possessed the authority to validly consent to a search, and whether the search was reasonable, will result in confusion for lower courts.170 By essentially
merging all three inquiries into one overarching question of reasonableness, lower courts are left to wonder to what extent these three
distinct analytic inquiries persist and how to resolve them.171 Had the
Court adhered to precedent, not only would lower courts now have a
clearer understanding of how to approach third party consent cases
under the Fourth Amendment, but courts could also avoid the weakening of potential defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights that will occur because of the Court’s new bright-line rule.172
B. The Court’s Blending of Different Fourth Amendment Inquiries Led
to a Bright-Line Rule that Insufficiently Protects Potential
Defendants
The Randolph Court’s confounding of the three separate tests
provided in its earlier Fourth Amendment cases forced the Court to
create a bright-line rule.173 The Court had to adopt this bright-line
rule because (1) it did not adopt a totality of the circumstances approach to determine reasonableness; and (2) to preserve the integrity
of United States v. Matlock and Illinois v. Rodriguez.174 The Court’s
bright-line rule, however, only arbitrarily protects potential defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights.175
170. See Peter B. Rutledge, Miranda and Reasonableness, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1011, 1018
(2005) (contending that “blended approaches” offer little guidance to lower courts seeking to apply them).
171. See Todd Witten, Note, Wilson v. Arkansas: Thirty Years After Ker the Supreme Court
Addresses the Knock and Announce Issue, 29 AKRON L. REV. 447, 465 (1996) (“Without a clear
legal framework to decipher the boundaries of a ‘reasonable search,’ the courts will be
unable to uniformly reconcile the competing policy goals of effective law enforcement and
protection of individual liberty.”).
172. See infra Part IV.B.2.
173. See infra Part IV.B.1.
174. See infra Part IV.B.1.
175. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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Without a Totality of the Circumstances Approach and to Preserve
Matlock and Rodriguez, the Randolph Court Resorted to
the Creation of a Bright-Line Rule

The Court’s confusion of the three tests set forth above forced it
to develop an avoidable bright-line rule under which the Fourth
Amendment protects only a present defendant who objects to a police
officer’s request to search, after a third party has consented to the
search.176 Instead of adopting a totality of the circumstances approach to determine the reasonableness of the search of Scott Randolph’s home, the Randolph Court assessed the reasonableness of the
search by utilizing the tests that determine whether a search occurred
and whether a third party possesses the authority to validly consent to
the search.177 If the Court had refrained from conflating these standards, it could have properly employed a totality of the circumstances
approach to find the search of the Randolph residence unreasonable;
a bright-line rule was unnecessary.178
Additionally, because it did not apply the totality of the circumstances test and instead relied on widely shared social expectations to
determine reasonableness, the Court had to fashion a bright-line rule
to explain the continued significance of Matlock and Rodriguez. The
Court acknowledged that the factual circumstances of these third
party consent cases were similar to the facts of Randolph.179 As a result, to maintain the reasoning of these cases, the Court crafted its
narrow rule to resolve the particular facts of Randolph in which Janet
Randolph consented to the search of the shared residence over Scott
Randolph’s express objection.180
2. The Court’s Bright-Line Rule Exposes Potential Defendants to
Privacy Violations
Although the Randolph Court found its bright-line rule justified
by practicality and simplicity,181 the application of this rule will not
likely be as beneficial as the Court suggests because it provides only
arbitrary protection to a potential defendant and contradicts the
176. See Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1536 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(discussing the “random” protection of the majority’s bright-line rule).
177. See supra Part IV.A.1–2.
178. See infra Part IV.C.1.
179. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1527 (noting that while the police obtained third party
consent and searched the premises, the Matlock defendant was nearby in a police car and
the Rodriguez defendant slept in his apartment).
180. See id. (admitting that its bright-line rule “draw[s] a fine line” with precedent).
181. Id.
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Court’s long-standing emphasis on guarding privacy interests in the
home. The Court’s bright-line rule will often allow police officers to
enter potential defendants’ homes due to the random protection that
it affords.182 Thus, as Chief Justice Roberts argued in dissent, if the
Court believes as strongly as it stated that the home is one’s castle,183
its strained and uncommon usage of the word “present,” which it used
to distinguish a defendant at the door from a defendant unfortunately
asleep in the next room, is unconvincing.184
In contrast to the Randolph Court’s minimal emphasis on potential defendants’ privacy interests, in Payton v. New York, the Court asserted that the “chief evil” against which the Fourth Amendment
protects is a law enforcement officer’s warrantless entry into an individual’s home.185 The Court has also described the Fourth Amendment’s protection of privacy in the home as “centuries-old” and “at
the core of the Fourth Amendment.”186 Similarly, the principle expressed in Kyllo v. United States and in United States v. Karo—that potential defendants have legitimate expectations of privacy in their homes
which society recognizes as reasonable—further underscores the premium that the Court has placed on protecting privacy within the
home.187 Given this well-established focus on privacy in the home, the
Randolph Court’s fine line does not adequately protect a potential defendant’s privacy interests.
Not only does the Court’s bright-line rule minimize a potential
defendant’s privacy interests by making Fourth Amendment rights
heavily dependent on a potential defendant’s location in the home,
but the Court’s reasoning could also prevent a potential defendant
from controlling this location. Although the Randolph Court indicated that its decision does not permit law enforcement officers to
remove a defendant from the doorway to prevent his or her objection
182. See id. (commenting that a nearby potential defendant who would object to a
search of a shared premises will not receive Fourth Amendment protection because he is
not present and objecting when law enforcement officers obtain the consent of another cooccupant).
183. Id. at 1524.
184. See id. at 1535 n.1 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (contending that the differential treatment afforded by the majority’s rule to a defendant present at the doorway to his residence
versus a defendant asleep in his residence does not offer “great protection to a man in his
castle”).
185. 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United
States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
186. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610, 612 (1999). The Court has further emphasized
that a defendant has a greater expectation of privacy in his or her home than in commercial property. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998).
187. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705,
714 (1984).
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to a search,188 its decision will likely do the opposite. For example, in
United States v. Matlock,189 the police effectively eliminated the defendant’s opportunity to object to the search by removing him from the
front yard of his shared residence and placing him in a police car away
from the residence.190 Under the Randolph rule, a police officer could
get away with removing a defendant from the scene to prevent an objection if the evidence does not reveal the reason for the defendant’s
absence.191 This unintended result stems from the Court’s desire to
refrain from turning every consent case into “a test about the adequacy of the police’s efforts” and, therefore, a reviewing court would
not likely examine the officer’s motives in such a situation.192 Such a
result, however, again contradicts the purpose of the Fourth Amendment and the Court’s emphasis on protecting potential defendants’
privacy interests.193
C. Instead of Adopting Its Bright-Line Rule, the Randolph Court
Should Have Expressly Adopted a Totality of the Circumstances
Approach to Resolve Reasonableness
The Randolph Court should have employed a totality of the circumstances approach to determine reasonableness; it would have
reached the same ultimate result and invalidated Janet Randolph’s
consent in the face of Scott Randolph’s express objection to the
search.194 Moreover, had the Court analyzed the totality of the cir188. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1527.
189. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
190. See id. at 179 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (expounding upon the Matlock facts); see also
Elizabeth A. Wright, Note, Third Party Consent Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Refusal,
Consent, and Reasonableness, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1841, 1871 (2005) (surmising that after
Matlock a law enforcement officer could avoid obtaining a potential defendant’s consent by
removing the potential defendant from the premises to be searched).
191. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1527 (“So long as there is no evidence that the police
have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a
possible objection, there is practical value in the simple clarity of [the Court’s bright-line
rule] . . . .”).
192. See id. at 1527–28 (justifying its decision to draw a line between present and absent
objectors because the Court did not want consent cases to hinge entirely upon the officer’s
attempts to locate the potential defendant).
193. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971) (noting that the
Fourth Amendment protects individuals’ privacy from capricious invasion by police officers (citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949))); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment sought to interpose a “neutral and detached magistrate” between law enforcement officers and potential defendants); see also supra notes 185–187 and accompanying text.
194. See infra Part IV.C.1.

R
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cumstances instead of creating a bright-line rule, it could have better
protected potential defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights.195
1. The Randolph Court Could Have Properly Invalidated the Search
with a Totality of the Circumstances Approach
Although the Court’s reasoning confused three separate Fourth
Amendment tests, it nevertheless reached a result consistent with the
proper application of precedent.196 Although Matlock and Frazier dictate that Janet Randolph had the authority to consent to the search
because both she and Scott Randolph had assumed this risk,197 the
Court could have used a totality of the circumstances analysis to determine that the search was unreasonable because Scott Randolph, as a
co-occupant, was present and objected to the search.198
If the Court had adopted a totality of the circumstances approach
to decide reasonableness, in addition to considering Scott Randolph’s
objection, the Court could have taken into account other surrounding
circumstances.199 As Justice Breyer noted in his concurrence, this
case involved only a search for evidence and Sergeant Murray did not
conduct the search out of concern that Scott Randolph would destroy
the drug evidence.200 Additionally, as Judge Phipps emphasized in his
concurrence to the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals of Georgia, Janet Randolph merely accused Scott Randolph of illicit conduct
and no objective indication existed to suggest that Scott Randolph
had committed a crime prior to the search.201 Based on these circum195. See infra Part IV.C.2.
196. Specifically, the Randolph Court properly concluded that, despite Janet Randolph’s
consent, the search was unreasonable as to Scott Randolph because he expressly objected
to the police officer’s request to search. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1519, 1528.
197. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170–71 & n.7 (1974) (explaining that a
third party possesses the requisite authority to consent to a search if the parties use and
have access to the property, which makes it reasonable for each co-occupant to assume the
risk that another co-occupant will allow a law enforcement officer to search the shared
premises); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (recognizing that an individual sharing a duffel bag with another assumed the risk that the other user would permit police
officers to search the bag).
198. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1530 (Breyer, J., concurring).
199. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (indicating explicitly that reasonableness is determined by objectively evaluating the totality of the circumstances); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507 (1978) (listing several factual inquiries to undertake in
assessing the reasonableness of an investigatory fire search); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 765 (1969) (explaining that the Court examines the “total atmosphere of the case”
when it measures the reasonableness of a search (citing United States v. Rabinowitz, 399
U.S. 56, 66 (1950)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
200. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1530 (Breyer, J., concurring).
201. Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834, 843 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (Phipps, J., concurring
specially).
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stances, the Court could have properly found the search of Scott Randolph’s property unreasonable despite Janet Randolph’s consent.202
2. A Totality of the Circumstances Analysis Would Have Better
Protected Potential Defendants’ Fourth Amendment Rights
If the Randolph Court had adopted the totality of the circumstances test to assess reasonableness instead of inventing a new rule, it
could have refrained from arbitrarily conditioning defendants’ Fourth
Amendment rights on their location by leaving the resolution of different cases open for the future.203 For example, one could imagine a
deaf or mute defendant who, unlike Scott Randolph, is unable to explicitly object to a search for physical reasons despite his or her presence at the doorway. As Chief Justice Roberts pointed out in dissent,
the majority does not indicate that its bright-line rule would consider
these types of circumstances;204 however, a more fact-based totality of
the circumstances approach could take such considerations into account when evaluating reasonableness.205
Furthermore, the majority explained that it would not take a potential defendant’s location into account if he or she is not present at
the doorway to the searched residence when a police officer requests
consent.206 This approach may, however, create an incentive for police officers to avoid making their presence known to a potential defendant who is nearby, when consent might easily be obtained from
another co-occupant.207 A totality of the circumstances analysis that
202. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1530–31 (Breyer, J., concurring) (concurring in the
Court’s opinion because of the specific circumstances present in the case); Randolph, 590
S.E.2d at 840–43 (Phipps, J., concurring specially) (advocating and applying a totality of
the circumstances approach to conclude that Janet Randolph’s consent was ineffective in
the face of her husband’s objection to the search).
203. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1530 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that the results of
future cases should depend on the circumstances presented in those cases).
204. See id. at 1528 (majority opinion) (“This case invites a straightforward application
of the rule that a physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police
search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant.”). Chief
Justice Roberts underscored this point when he stated that the majority had not adopted a
case-specific holding, but rather created a rule. Id. at 1539 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
205. Cf. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (insisting that Fourth Amendment
reasonableness turns on the facts of a case); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507 (1978)
(considering the facts of the case in comparing a potential defendant’s privacy interests
with the government’s law enforcement needs); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765
(1969) (resolving reasonableness by examining the facts and circumstances of the case).
206. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1527 (clarifying that a police officer has no affirmative
duty to awake a potential defendant who is asleep in his apartment when the police receive
consent to search the premises from a third party).
207. See, e.g., Tammy Campbell, Note, Illinois v. Rodriguez: Should Apparent Authority Validate Third-Party Consent Searches?, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 481, 500 (1992) (arguing that Illinois
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considers a potential defendant’s whereabouts and whether a police
officer knew, or reasonably should have known, of the potential defendant when he or she obtained consent would counteract this incentive and remain consistent with the standard to which police
officers are held under Illinois v. Rodriguez.208 While the majority appropriately decided only the case before it,209 the above examples illustrate why the Court should have explicitly adopted the totality of
the circumstances approach advocated in Justice Breyer’s
concurrence.210
V.

CONCLUSION

In Georgia v. Randolph, the Supreme Court properly held that Janet Randolph’s consent could not override Scott Randolph’s express
objection to the search of their shared home.211 In so holding, however, the Court failed to distinguish three separate Fourth Amendment inquiries, and borrowed elements from each in its reasoning.212
The conflation of these tests forced the Court to draw an extremely
fine line that will only precariously protect the Fourth Amendment
rights of future defendants.213 Although the Court reached the
proper result, it could have avoided articulating an arbitrary rule by
expressly adopting a totality of the circumstances approach for disputed consent cases.214
ADRIENNE WINEHOLT

v. Rodriguez provides an incentive for law enforcement officers to ignore significant facts
that signal whether a third party has the authority to validly consent to a search); Michael
C. Wieber, Comment, The Theory and Practice of Illinois v. Rodriguez: Why an Officer’s Reasonable Belief About a Third Party’s Authority to Consent Does Not Protect a Criminal Suspect’s Rights,
84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 604, 620 (1993) (same).
208. See 497 U.S. 177, 185–86 (1990) (holding police officers to the standard of a reasonable person).
209. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1526 n.8 (responding to the dissent’s criticism that the
Randolph majority did not determine the constitutionality of a search of a third co-occupant’s property if one co-occupant consented while another co-occupant simultaneously
objected).
210. Id. at 1529–30 (Breyer, J., concurring).
211. Id. at 1528 (majority opinion).
212. See supra Part IV.A.
213. See supra Part IV.B.
214. See supra Part IV.C.

